Friday, May 24, 2013

The Under-appreciated: Matt Greene


What better way to see the value of a punishing defensive-defenseman than Matt Greene in game 5 against the Sharks? There's been a certain sentiment that defensive d-men are going extinct in the post lockout NHL, but while it did weed out some of the defenseman with suspect hockey-sense, there still very much is a role for Matt Greene types. 

Matt Greene was plastering Sharks into the boards and over the ice all game long, setting a physical tone for the whole team to follow, San Jose's forecheck soon went MIA and they had trouble even with breakouts from their own zone as the Kings established their physical dominance. 

How do you quantify the value of that? You can't. Maybe the Oilers should pay attention the next time they deal players like Stoll and Greene away, the same type they now years later are looking for to supplement their kids with. 


Monday, May 20, 2013

Elias Lindholm and the 2013 draft class


If you follow the news about the upcoming 2013 NHL draft, you might have seen that by now the general feeling is that there is a tier of difference between the likes of Barkov, Drouin, Nichuskin and sometimes others (Jones and MacKinnon figure as the top two in nearly every list there is) and the next tier. Rarely if ever do you see Elias Lindholm mentioned in the same tier, despite the fact that in my opinion he should be. Not only that I think Lindhom is going to end up being the better player, ahead of Barkov, Drouin and Nichuskin, aside from Jones and MacKinnon there is no other player I would consider ahead of Lindholm in this draft.


So why does he get consistently rated below others? Well the simple fact is, most of Lindholm's strengths aren't all that visible with the naked eye, he does not have a standout factor like many others do, his technical skills are good but not elite, physically he is good but not elite. So why think so highly of Lindholm, he doesn't have the size of Barkov, he doesn't have the hands of Drouin, he doesn't have the skill and size combination of Nichuskin, what is it then? Elias Lindholm possesses a very rare trait, one that is invaluable in the NHL and in small rinks in particular and that is his ability to put it into overdrive – the 6th gear and the ability to make plays in very tight spaces with very little time, his vision is as good as there is in this draft but coupled with his aggression and the ability to make plays out of nothing with limited space and time makes him a special player. The willingness to attack the dirty areas of the ice with agression and the elusiveness coupled with the elite vision and very good hands to capitalize on those situations brings back the memories of another Swede – Peter Forsberg. Though expecting Lindholm to reach that level is a bit optimistic, I fully expect him to wreak havoc on opposition in much the same way stylistically. The combination of the willingness to play in the dirty areas of the ice, the elite vision, and the ability to switch into overdrive should be enough to put Lindholm into the discussion with the top forwards in this draft, I would go as far as putting him directly behind MacKinnon among forwards in the 2013 NHL entry draft.

Saturday, May 11, 2013

What's Next for Vancouver Canucks?

If you listened to Mike Gillis' press conference, you should get a pretty good idea at what's ahead for the Canucks. Gillis pointed out the trend towards big, physical, tough to play against teams as opposed to teams more focused on pure skill (though judging by his words he's not a fan of that trend at all).



The Canucks figure to get younger and probably bigger, the gameplan seems to be to surround their core with those type of players  that will hopefully be able to go against the bigger teams like LA, STL, SJ etc. This seems like a realistic path forward, however the thing that interests me is whether the Canucks will also change their player deployment. Mike Gillis did not talk about this at all nor was he ever questioned about it, however if you take a look at the teams Gillis was reffering to they all feature their top players drawing the toughest assignments all over the ice, often getting power-vs-power matchups equally in the defensive as well as offensive zone. The Canucks are actually a polar opposite of this with their role specialization (more on this here). Although that really can be argued is a coaching issue, and Gillis did say coaching will be evaluated like everything else.

So what should be the next step for the Canucks? As Gillis said, a bigger, tougher to play against look is in store, but it should be important not to forget about the fact that most of the teams that had success in the last few years also favor a more complete role for their top forwards than the Canucks do, the big question is how would the Sedins perform in such matchups not only in the offensive zone but the defensive zone (and possibly PK) as well, and it is something that Canucks should explore as they in Gillis' words hit the reset button. If it turns out the Sedins just can't handle that type of complete role bigger changes might be in store than just surrounding them with bigger, tougher support players.

Friday, May 3, 2013

The Anatomy of a Budget Team


With the Phoenix Coyotes and Nashville Predators finally missing the playoffs for the first time in years (2008-2009 season to be exact), it might be time to look at how the two teams with relatively low payrolls managed to have a decent amount of success. Using Capgeek's archives we can see that Phoenix ranked 29th, 22nd and 22nd in spending from 2009-2010 to 2011-2012 season, while Nasville ranked 28th, 21nd and 23rd in the same time frame.

So how did those two teams make the playoffs year after year despite never getting much attention from various experts and the low payroll?



Roster
Both teams do not possess much of high-end skill up front as that is the most expensive thing in the market. Instead both teams focus on sound two-way players with the ability to win puck-battles and play sound defensive hockey. They have sound, tough to play against two-way centers like Hanzal, Fisher, Legwand who don't posses the salary  or skill of their more high end counterparts, but still provide the element needed to carry out the type of game Predators and Coyotes want to play. Both teams avoid sinking money into high end wingers instead opting for either for cheaper skill wingers like Ray Whitney (left as UFA), Sergei Kostitsyn, Radim Vrbata, or opt for wingers who provide a different game like Hornqvist and of course the big name in Phoenix – Shane Doan (more on this here),. Both teams however favor a strong and deep defense group – Yandle, OEL, Weber, Suter (left as UFA) and a plethora of other serviceable defensemen and high end prospects in both systems. Nashville also has an all-star goalie in Pekka Rinne, while Phoenix had Bryzgalov and Smith later on.

Coaching
Dave Tippett and Barry Trotz are two excellent coaches who have provided their teams with a structure that lends itself to the type of players they have and can afford. Both teams place emphasis on sound, defensively aware hockey with a strong emphasis on winning puck battles which goes hand in hand with the roster both coaches have at disposal. This makes both teams hard to play against, this type of hockey tends to keep games close even when they're playing against teams that can boast a higher talent level, it is very rare that you will see either team have the kind of defensive meltdown that would put the game out of hand for them.

Drafting and development
Both teams, but especially the Predators have kept their system going with new prospects being brought in and developed. Both teams have had their defense flushed with projectable prospects. Nashville especially has been a gold mine of young defensemen over the past couple of years.

So how do the Predators and Coyotes do it?
The success of Phoenix and Nashville despite the low payrolls is a result of a well oiled machine that mixes sound roster decisions (the avodiance of high end skill and flash up front in favor of cheaper all around ability and strong defense), coaching (defensively sound teams focused on winning puck battles and outcompeting the opposition) and drafting and development (a steady intake of useful cheap young players to fill the holes) under one philosophy.



How close were/are they?
Both teams were likely a true #1 high end center away from being legitimate contenders or an overall deeper forward group. If you add more high end skill up front you arrive at the two teams who are the logical extension of the Phoenix/Nashville model – the Boston Bruins and the Los Angeles Kings who do a lot of the things the same way but with more high end skill up front. To conclude, both Phoenix and Nashville are two teams who clearly do things "the right way" but simply didn't have the financial muscle to go further than they did. If they did it wouldn't be unimaginable that you'd be looking at them the same way you look at the Boston Bruins and the Los Angeles Kings which is pretty much the same model Phoenix/Nashville uses brought to it's logical conclusion.